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SCOPE OF REVIEWABLE EVIDENCE IN  
NEPA PREDETERMINATION CASES:  
WHY GOING OFF THE RECORD  
PUTS COURTS ON TARGET 
Jesse Garfinkle* 
Abstract: Plaintiffs challenging an agency’s environmental impact state-
ment on the grounds of predetermination have been met with different 
judicially created evidentiary standards. Under the Fourth Circuit’s ap-
proach, as applied in National Audubon Society v. Department of the Navy, 
courts should restrict the scope of reviewable evidence to the administra-
tive record. Under the Tenth Circuit’s approach, however, extra-record ev-
idence may also be considered in determining predetermination claims. 
In Forest Guardians v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Tenth Circuit consid-
ered emails, intra-agency correspondence, and a grant agreement outside 
the scope of the administrative record, and concluded that the agency had 
not predetermined the outcome of its impact statement. This Note advo-
cates for the universal adoption of the expansive Tenth Circuit approach 
because of the importance of extra-record evidence in predetermination 
cases and its minimal risk to agency independence. 
Introduction 
 Federal agencies stand at the front lines of both the national de-
fense and preservation of the environment.1 To this end, the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires agencies to carefully con-
sider the environmental impacts of their proposed monitoring or exe-
cuting actions before proceeding.2 A key mechanism to ensure the 
proper execution of this duty is NEPA’s proscription of an agency’s 
commitment of resources to a certain course of action prior to the 
completion of this analysis.3 In prohibiting such premature commit-
ments, NEPA not only seeks to ensure comprehensive environmental 
analyses but also to eliminate sunk costs—namely the premature in-
vestment of resources into undesirable courses of action that may result 
                                                                                                                      
* Managing Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2011–12. 
1See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2006). 
2 See id. § 4332. 
3 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (2010). 
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in negative environmental consequences.4 This prohibition serves to 
prevent predetermined outcomes of environmental analyses.5 
 Although NEPA imposes this critical mandate, the statute is silent 
on the enforcement of this duty and thus it is left entirely to reviewing 
courts.6 Courts have long struggled with the proper standards for re-
viewing predetermination claims in environmental analyses under 
NEPA, and the permissible scope of evidence on review continues to 
divide federal circuit courts.7 Courts consistently disagree on the pro-
priety of broad evidentiary review, the efficacy of narrowly tailored re-
view in rooting out predetermination, and the inherent dangers and 
safeguards of off the record judicial review.8 In its recent opinion, Forest 
Guardians v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Tenth Circuit highlights 
the central debate regarding the consideration of evidence not in-
cluded in the administrative record.9 Whereas the Fourth Circuit ap-
plies a narrow evidentiary scope allowing only evidence on the re-
cord,10 the Tenth Circuit uses an expansive approach that allows ex-
amination of extrinsic evidence.11 
 This Note explores how the Tenth Circuit’s broad evidentiary ap-
proach ensures both rigorous enforcement of NEPA’s procedures and 
adequate protection of the nation’s environment from the risks of 
agency predetermination.12 Part I of this Note considers the statutory 
and regulatory framework that imposes agency responsibilities, and 
addresses the issue of predetermination. Parts II and III explore both 
statutory and common law standards for evaluating agency predeter-
mination claims. Part IV demonstrates the need for a broad evidentiary 
approach, consistent with that of the Tenth Circuit, in assessing allega-
tions of predetermination. 
                                                                                                                      
4 See infra notes 28–51 and accompanying text. 
5 See infra notes 73–78 and accompanying text. 
6 See infra notes 95–102 and accompanying text. 
7 Compare Forest Guardians v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 611 F.3d 692, 716–17 (10th Cir. 
2010), with Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Dep’t of the Navy, 422 F.3d 174, 198–99 (4th Cir. 2005). 
8 Compare Forest Guardians, 611 F.3d at 716–17 (considering extra-record emails, meeting 
minutes, and a grant agreement), and Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1143–44 (9th Cir. 
2000) (considering extra-record contracts), and Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1112 (10th 
Cir. 2002) (considering extra-record addendum to a services agreement), with Nat’l Audubon, 
422 F.3d at 198–99 (refusing to consider extra-record evidence), and Fayetteville Area Cham-
ber of Commerce v. Volpe, 515 F.2d 1021, 1026 (4th Cir. 1975) (noting reluctance to exam-
ine subjective impartiality of agency decisionmakers). 
9 See 611 F.3d at 716–17; Nat’l Audubon, 422 F.3d at 198–99. 
10 Nat’l Audubon, 422 F.3d at 198–99. 
11 See Forest Guardians, 611 F.3d at 716–17. 
12 See infra notes 145–197 and accompanying text. 
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I. Statutory and Regulatory Framework 
A. The National Environmental Policy Act 
 Environmental protection has long been a serious concern in 
modern American government.13 Congress enacted NEPA in recogni-
tion of “the profound impact of man’s activity on the interrelations of 
all components of the natural environment,” and as a means to restore 
order and maintain environmental quality.14 NEPA declares a national 
policy encouraging the prevention and elimination of environmental 
damage.15 In pursuit of this purpose, Congress instructs all federal 
agencies to preserve, protect, and enhance the environment.16 
 Congress delineates the responsibilities of federal agencies under 
NEPA in section 102(2).17 First, it requires federal agencies to consider 
every significant environmental aspect of a proposed action.18 Under 
this directive, NEPA mandates that a federal agency include, in every 
recommendation or report on legislative proposals and other major 
federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the environment, a 
detailed statement on the environmental impact and unavoidable ad-
verse environmental effects of the proposed action, as well as alterna-
tives to the proposed action.19 This document is called an Environ-
mental Impact Statement (EIS).20 Second, it guarantees that relevant 
                                                                                                                      
13 See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2006). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. §§ 4331–4332. 
17 Id. § 4332. 
18 Id. § 4332(C); Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97 
(1983). 
19 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). Agencies must: 
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and 
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on—(i) the en-
vironmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental 
effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) al-
ternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-
term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of 
long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commit-
ments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it 
be implemented. 
Id. 
20 Environmental Management—Environmental Impact Statement, Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
http://www.epa.gov/ebtpages/envienvironmentalimpactstatement.html (last visited Jan 
18, 2012); see Nat’l Audubon, 422 F.3d at 181. 
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information will be made available to the public, thus allowing citizens 
to play a role in both the decision-making and implementation proc-
esses.21 By requiring a comprehensive evaluation of environmental im-
pacts prior to a Record of Decision,22 NEPA seeks to avoid sunk costs 
arising from investment in a course of action that may not be the best 
alternative as determined by the EIS.23 Sunk costs result when a propo-
nent of an action invests significant expenses or resources into early 
stages of a proposal.24 Aside from wasting money, time, and resources, 
such actions often harm the environment in ways that statutes like NEPA 
are designed to prevent.25 Courts are often left with tremendously diffi-
cult, and highly pressured, decisions as to whether to enforce environ-
mental laws or to avoid wasted resources and sunk costs.26 Additionally, 
the prevention of such sunk costs plays a role in preserving the viability 
of alternatives that could otherwise be precluded if significant invest-
ment in a more harmful course of action had already occurred.27 
B. Council on Environmental Quality 
 NEPA’s procedural requirements alone are insufficient to ensure 
meaningful environmental protection, and thus section 202 of the stat-
ute created the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)28 to oversee 
the it’s implementation.29 Although NEPA does not expressly authorize 
the CEQ to promulgate regulations, President Carter added this re-
sponsibility by Executive Order in 1977.30 These regulations instruct 
federal agencies on how to comply with NEPA’s procedures and poli-
                                                                                                                      
21 See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349–50 (1989). 
22 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2 (2010). A Record of Decision must include: (a) what the decision 
was; (b) alternatives considered in making the decision, including preferred alternatives; (c) 
whether all practicable means of avoiding or minimizing environmental harm have been 
adopted, and if not, why they were not. Id. 
23 See Jeffrey S. Kopf, Comment, Steamrolling Section 7(D) of the Endangered Species Act: 
How Sunk Costs Undermine Environmental Regulation, 23 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 393, 400 
(1996). 
24 Id. at 393–94. 
25 See id. at 394. 
26 Id. 
27 See id. at 400. 
28 See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (2006). 
29 See id. § 4344. 
30 Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (May 24, 1977). “Subsection (h) of Sec-
tion 3 (relating to responsibilities of the Council on Environmental Quality) of Executive 
Order No. 11514, as amended, is revised to read as follows: ‘(h) Issue regulations to Fed-
eral agencies for the implementation of the procedural provisions of [NEPA],’ including 
the [Environmental Impact Statement] process.” Id. 
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cies.31 CEQ regulations are binding on all federal agencies32 and serve 
as formal guidance to the courts on the application of NEPA.33 The 
CEQ’s regulatory processes explicitly ensure that environmental infor-
mation is made available to the public before decisions are made or 
actions are taken.34 
 An environmental impact analysis occurs in two distinct forms un-
der CEQ regulations pursuant to NEPA.35 The first method of analysis is 
the EIS, which an agency must prepare when it has reason to believe 
that a proposed action may have environmental impacts.36 EISs must be 
“analytic rather than encyclopedic,”37 and concise, varying in length 
with potential environmental problems and project size.38 An EIS must 
state the alternatives considered, and any subsequent decisions that rely 
on it must meet the procedural and policy requirements of NEPA.39 The 
spectrum of alternatives considered within an EIS must also include po-
tential alternatives to be considered by the ultimate agency decision-
maker.40 Section 1502.14(e) of the CEQ regulations allows for, and ar-
guably encourages, preferred alternatives in the EIS process.41 Addi-
tionally, the CEQ addresses the danger of agency predetermination by 
mandating that an agency must not commit resources that would preju-
dice selection of alternatives before making a final decision.42 This pro-
hibition is justified by the CEQ’s intention that the EIS serve as the 
means of assessing the environmental impact of proposed actions, ra-
ther than justifying decisions retroactively.43 Furthermore, CEQ regula-
tions require that “until an agency issues a [R]ecord of [D]ecision . . . 
no action concerning the proposal shall be taken which would: (1) 
[h]ave an adverse environmental impact; or (2) [l]imit the choice of 
reasonable alternatives.”44 This prohibition is aimed at preventing sunk 
                                                                                                                      
31 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (2010). 
32 Id. § 1507.1. 
33 See Marsh v. Or. Nat’l Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 372 (1989). 
34 See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b). 
35 See id. § 1501.3 (establishing the Environmental Assessment (EA)); id. § 1502 (estab-
lishing the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)). 
36 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502. 
37 Id. § 1502.2(a). 
38 Id. § 1502.2(b)–(c). 
39 Id. § 1502.2(d). 
40 Id. § 1502.2(e). 
41 Id. § 1502.14(e). 
42 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2(f). 
43 Id. § 1502.2(g). 
44 Id. § 1506.1(a). 
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costs that may result in the preclusion of better alternatives or the im-
proper selection of a more environmentally harmful course of action.45 
 The second form of environmental impact analysis under NEPA is 
the Environmental Assessment (EA).46 An EA is a concise public docu-
ment that must provide sufficient evidence and analysis to determine 
whether a “finding of no significant impact” (FONSI) is warranted or 
an EIS is required.47 CEQ regulations require that “[a]gencies shall 
prepare an [E]nvironmental [A]ssessment . . . when necessary under 
the procedures adopted by individual agencies to supplement these 
regulations.”48 An EA is not required when an agency is otherwise pre-
paring an EIS, as the environmental impacts are adequately examined 
and reported.49 An EA, however, assists an agency’s preparation of an 
EIS when one is necessary.50 If significant environmental impacts are 
demonstrated by an EA, the agency must prepare an EIS; if not, the 
agency issues a FONSI.51 
II. Judicial Review of Agency Decisions Under NEPA 
A. Arbitrary and Capricious 
 When courts are called to review an agency’s Environmental Im-
pact Statement (EIS) or Environmental Assessment (EA) under NEPA, 
they are presented with a limited number of flexible standards that 
provide a significant amount of judicial discretion in their applica-
tion.52 NEPA provides no explicit guidance to courts in reviewing an 
agency’s compliance with its procedural provisions.53 It also does not 
contain a citizen suit provision to enable private parties to enforce vio-
lations of its requirements.54 Due to this omission, private citizens and 
environmental groups must file suit under the Administrative Proce-
                                                                                                                      
45 Kopf, supra note 23, at 400. 
46 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3. This Note will refer to both EISs and EAs as environmental im-
pact analyses, and, in discussing agency predetermination for the purposes of this Note, 
the two forms of analysis are treated as the same. 
47 Id. § 1508.9(a). 
48 Id. § 1501.3(a). 
49 See id. 
50 Id. § 1508.9(3). 
51 See id. § 1501.4. 
52 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006); Daniel R. Mandelker, 
NEPA Law and Litig. § 8.7 (2d ed. & Supp. 2010). 
53 See Mandelker, supra note 52, § 8.7. 
54 Frank B. Cross, Fed. Envtl. Reg. of Real Est., § 1.21(2008 Supp. 2011). 
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dure Act (APA).55 Federal district courts have jurisdiction over cases 
involving agency compliance with the provisions of NEPA.56 
 Section 706 of the APA enables federal courts to find unlawful and 
invalidate agency actions, findings, and conclusions57 if they violate any 
of six specified standards.58 In Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 
the Supreme Court tackled the question of judicial review under NEPA 
in accordance with APA standards.59 In Marsh, the Court considered a 
suit, brought by a nonprofit organization, to enjoin the building of a 
dam based on allegations that the Army Corps of Engineers had vio-
lated NEPA’s EIS requirements.60 The Court determined that a “rea-
sonableness” standard would not provide enough deference to the in-
formed discretion of the agency.61 Reluctant to engage in its own de-
termination of “reasonableness” on substantive matters, the Court held 
that the “arbitrary and capricious” standard should instead be applied 
to NEPA cases.62 This standard, applied under the APA to NEPA, allows 
a court to set aside an agency’s action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”63 The 
Marsh Court took notice of the Ninth Circuit’s use of the reasonable-
ness standard, but noted that the standard was not uniformly adopted 
among the circuits and that very little pragmatic difference existed be-
tween the two standards.64 Although departing from the Ninth Circuit’s 
                                                                                                                      
55 Id. 
56 Coahoma Chem. Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 358 F. Supp. 680, 682 (1973). 
57 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006). 
58 Id. Section 706 reads: 
Under the APA, a court can set aside any agency action which is: “(A) arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in 
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory 
right (D) without observance of procedure required by law; (E) unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case subject to [trial-type proceedings]; or (F) 
unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de no-
vo by the reviewing court. 
Id. 
59 490 U.S. 360, 375 (1989). 
60 Id. at 360. 
61 Id. at 375–78. Although deference should be given, the Court warned that “courts 
should not automatically defer to the agency’s express reliance on an interest in finality 
without carefully reviewing the record and satisfying themselves that the agency has made 
a reasoned decision based on its evaluation of the significance—or lack of significance—of 
the new information.” Id. at 378. 
62Id. at 375–78. 
63 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). 
64 490 U.S. at 377 n.23. 
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application of the reasonableness standard, the Court agreed that it 
makes sense to distinguish the strong level of deference accorded to an 
agency in deciding factual or technical matters from the lesser defer-
ence given when considering predominantly legal questions.65 Thus, 
the arbitrary and capricious standard is now applied consistently in 
substantive NEPA cases.66 
B. Hard Look Doctrine 
 In the wake of prolonged debate regarding the proper application 
of the arbitrary and capricious standard,67 the “hard look” doctrine 
emerged from Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC.68 In that case, the 
court explained that the “supervisory function calls on the court to in-
tervene . . . if the court becomes aware, especially from a combination of 
danger signals, that the agency has not really taken a ‘hard look’ at the 
salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision 
making.”69 If the agency took a hard look at the issue, however, the 
court should affirm the agency’s action even if the court would “have 
made different findings or adopted different standards.”70 Further-
more, the opinion stated that a court should not disturb an agency deci-
sion due to immaterial errors because the doctrine of harmless error is 
appropriate in such circumstances.71 This doctrine has become the cor-
nerstone for judicial review on federal administrative agency actions, 
and courts use it to apply the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard in 
determining whether an agency analysis was adequate under NEPA.72 
C. Predetermination: The Irretrievable and Irreversible  
Commitment of Resources 
 In applying these standards, courts uphold CEQ regulations pro-
hibiting predetermined decisions prior to the completion of an EIS or 
                                                                                                                      
65 See id. at 376–77. 
66See, e.g., Forest Guardians v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 611 F.3d 692, 716–17 (10th 
Cir. 2010); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Dep’t of the Navy, 422 F.3d 174, 198–99 (4th Cir. 2005); 
Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000). 
67 Devin Kirby, Casenote, What Is the “Hard Look” That the Ninth Circuit Is Looking for 
When Reviewing United States Forest Service Actions Under NEPA? Native Ecosystems Council, et 
al. v. United States Forest Service, et al., Mo. Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 213, 216 (2003). 
68 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Kirby, supra note 67, at 216. 
69 444 F.2d at 851. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72See, e.g., Forest Guardians, 611 F.3d at 710–11; Nat’l Audubon, 422 F.3d at 181; Metcalf, 
214 F.3d at 1145. 
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EA by finding that such predetermination precludes an agency from 
taking the requisite hard look.73 Section 1502.2 clearly prohibits such 
predetermination, stating that “[a]gencies shall not commit resources 
prejudicing selection of alternatives before making a final decision.”74 
Courts have established a threshold for such predetermination, namely 
the “irretrievable and irreversible commitment of resources” to a course 
of action prior to the completion of the environmental impact analy-
sis.75 The temporal threshold of such a commitment of resources is con-
sistent with the CEQ’s stance that judicial review of agency compliance 
only occur after an agency has either filed the final EIS or FONSI, or 
takes action that will result in irreparable harm to the environment.76 
Courts have held that such an irreversible commitment of resources “se-
riously imped[es] the degree to which [an agency’s] planning and deci-
sions could reflect environmental values.”77 In light of NEPA’s guiding 
policies and the CEQ’s procedural regulations, courts have consistently 
held that violations of the arbitrary and capricious standard occur when 
an agency prematurely and irretrievably commits resources to an alter-
native prior to the completion of an environmental impact analysis.78 
D. Record Rule 
 Courts have widely recognized that an agency need not be “subjec-
tively impartial” in making a conclusion about environmental impacts 
pursuant to section 1502.14(e)’s allowance for preferred alternatives,79 
as well as the inevitability that an agency will develop a preference for 
one form of action over others.80 Furthermore, courts adhere to the 
principle that the judiciary should not engage in substantive analysis of 
the wisdom of a chosen plan of action, as judges are neither experts in 
the field nor tasked with such statutory responsibility.81 There is a clear 
lack of consensus, however, on how to fulfill the judicial role in review-
ing agency decisions, with some courts willing to review only evidence 
                                                                                                                      
73 See Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1145; 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2(f) (2010). 
74 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2(f). 
75 Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1446 (9th Cir. 1988). 
76 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3. 
77 Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1143. 
78 See, e.g., id. at 1145; Conner, 848 F.2d at 1446, 1462. 
79 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14. 
80 See Forest Guardians, 611 F.3d at 712. 
81 See Nat’l Audubon, 422 F.3d at 198–99. 
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in the administrative record and others allowing the consideration of 
extrinsic evidence.82 
 The seminal case in the debate regarding the consideration of evi-
dence outside of the administrative record is Citizens to Preserve Overton 
Park v. Volpe, in which the Supreme Court considered a suit brought by 
private parties to enjoin the Department of Transportation (DOT) 
from releasing funds for construction of a highway.83 The Court held 
that judicial review is to be based on the full administrative record that 
was before the ultimate decisionmaker at the time of the decision.84 
This limitation derived primarily from section 706 of the APA, which 
instructs a reviewing court to review the whole record or those parts 
cited by a party.85 The Court’s interpretation of this language has led to 
the modern doctrine known as the “record rule,” which effectively lim-
its a reviewing court’s consideration of the evidence to the administra-
tive record.86 
 Courts have recognized some exceptions to the record rule.87 The 
Supreme Court held that extra-record investigation may be appropriate 
when there has been a strong showing of bad faith or improper behav-
ior on the part of the decisionmakers, or where the absence of formal 
administrative findings necessitates an investigation to determine the 
reasons for the agency’s choice.88 In addition to these general excep-
tions explicitly established by the Supreme Court,89 an exception tai-
lored specifically for NEPA review also exists.90 The Second Circuit, in 
Suffolk County v. Secretary of the Interior, noted that “a primary function of 
the court is to [e]nsure that the information available to the [deci-
sionmaker] includes an adequate discussion of environmental effects 
                                                                                                                      
82 See Forest Guardians, 611 F.3d at 716–17; Nat’l Audubon, 422 F.3d at 198–99. 
83 401 U.S. 402, 406 (1971). 
84 Id. at 420. The Court did recognize that “[t]he court may require the administrative 
officials who participated in the decision to give testimony explaining their action. Of course, 
such inquiry into the mental processes of administrative decisionmakers is usually to be 
avoided.” Id. 
85 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006); Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 419. 
86 See Overton Park, 402 U.S. at 419–20; see also James N. Saul, Comment, Overly Restrictive 
Administrative Records and the Frustration of Judicial Review, 38 Envtl. L. 1301, 1301 (2008). 
87 Susannah T. French, Comment, Judicial Review of the Administrative Record in NEPA 
Litigation, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 929, 931 (1993). 
88 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420; French, supra note 87, at 941, 952–53. 
89 Saul, supra note 86, at 1308–11. The general exceptions to the record rule include: 
(1) [w]here there is a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior; (2) [w]here a 
“bare” record frustrates effective judicial review; (3) [w]here a agency considered materials 
that it failed to include in the record; and (4) [w]here additional information is necessary 
to explain complex issues. Id. 
90 French, supra note 87, at 948–53. 
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and alternatives, which can sometimes be determined only by looking 
outside the administrative record to see what the agency may have ig-
nored.”91 The court recognized allegations that an EIS has omitted se-
rious environmental consequences, or has failed to adequately discuss 
some reasonable alternative, raise issues important enough to warrant 
the introduction of new evidence.92 These issues are sufficiently impor-
tant to allow for the consideration of extrinsic evidence both in chal-
lenges to the sufficiency of an EIS and in suits attacking an agency’s 
decision to issue a FONSI.93 Although the Supreme Court has not ex-
plicitly recognized this NEPA exception to the record rule, multiple 
circuit courts of appeal have applied it in reviewing agency decisions 
under NEPA.94 
III. Scope of Evidentiary Review in NEPA  
Predetermination Cases 
 Although courts generally agree on the application of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act standard,95 there is no statutory instruction re-
garding the proper scope of evidence to be considered by a court in re-
viewing agency impact analyses.96 There have been significant inconsis-
tencies in judicial reviews of citizen suits specifically alleging agency 
predetermination.97 Courts have generally agreed on the “trigger point” 
for predetermination, holding that an agency has violated NEPA when it 
made an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources to an 
outcome prior to making its final decision.98 Two distinct approaches, 
however, have been taken by courts regarding the appropriate scope of 
admissible evidence to determine if an agency has crossed this thresh-
old.99 Some courts, such as the Fourth Circuit, have adopted a narrow 
approach in reviewing agency Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) 
                                                                                                                      
91 562 F.2d 1368, 1384 (2d. Cir. 1977) (citations omitted); French, supra note 87, at 
950. 
92 Suffok County, 562 F.2d at 1384–85; French, supra note 87, at 950. 
93 Suffok County, 562 F.2d at 1384–85; French, supra note 87, at 950. 
94 See, e.g., Forest Guardians, 611 F.3d at 716–17; Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1143–44. 
95 See Forest Guardians v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 611 F.3d 692, 704 (10th Cir. 2010); 
Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000). 
96 French, supra note 87, at 938. 
97 Compare Forest Guardians, 611 F.3d at 716–17, with Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Dep’t of 
the Navy, 422 F.3d 174, 198–99 (4th Cir. 2005). 
98 See Forest Guardians, 611 F.3d at 714–15; Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1145; Conner v. Burford, 
848 F.2d 1441, 1446 (1988). 
99 Compare Forest Guardians, 611 F.3d at 716–17 (allowing consideration of extra-record 
evidence), with Nat’l Audubon, 422 F.3d at 198–99 (refusing to consider extra-record evi-
dence). 
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that limits reviewable evidence to the impact analysis prepared by the 
agency and prohibiting the consideration of any external material.100 
Other courts, such as the Tenth Circuit, have adopted a broad approach 
that allows examination of any material that tends to show that an agen-
cy passed the trigger point for predetermination.101 Under this latter 
approach, courts have considered government contracts, agency corre-
spondence, and other relevant evidence.102 
 This section first explores the evolution of the Fourth Circuit’s 
narrow approach, beginning with Fayatteville Area Chamber of Commerce v. 
Volpe103 and culminating in National Audubon Society v. Department of the 
Navy.104 The Tenth Circuit’s approach is then examined as applied by 
both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. The expansive standard is applied 
first by the Ninth Circuit in Metcalf v. Daley105 and more recently in the 
Tenth Circuit’s decisions in Davis v. Mineta,106 Lee v. U.S. Air Force,107 and 
Forest Guardians v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.108 These cases provide 
factual applications and competing reasoning for the exclusion or in-
clusion of extra-record evidence. 
A. Cases Utilizing the Narrow Scope of Review 
1. Roots of the Fourth Circuit’s Narrow Approach: Fayetteville Area 
Chamber of Commerce v. Volpe 
 In Fayetteville Area Chamber of Commerce v. Volpe, Fayetteville’s Cham-
ber of Commerce challenged an EIS submitted by the Department of 
Transportation (DOT) analyzing the environmental impacts of poten-
tial locations for a highway bypass in North Carolina.109 The plaintiffs 
argued that a state highway official’s administrative decision approving 
the location of the bypass precluded the proper EIS from being pre-
pared under NEPA, as it was essentially evidence of predetermination 
                                                                                                                      
100 Nat’l Audubon, 422 F.3d at 198–99. 
101 Forest Guardians, 611 F.3d at 716–17. 
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and grant agreement); Lee v. U.S. Air Force, 354 F.3d 1229, 1242 (10th Cir. 2004) (consid-
ering, but not admitting, an extra-record affidavit); Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1143 (considering 
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105 214 F.3d at 1143. 
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of the EIS’s outcome.110 The Fourth Circuit refused to consider the 
prior administrative decision as evidence of such predetermination, 
basing its decision on the Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ stance that the 
test for compliance with an EIS “is one of good faith objectivity rather 
than subjective impartiality.”111 This distinction is elucidated in Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, where the Eighth Circuit 
stated that it is possible for agency officials to comply in good faith with 
NEPA, even if they personally oppose its philosophy or have precon-
ceived attitudes and opinions as to the propriety of the project.112 
Deeming the administrative decision evidence of subjective intent, and 
thus disregarding it, the court found that the EIS was completed with 
good-faith objectivity and therefore upheld its validity because it was 
neither arbitrary nor capricious.113 
2. Modern Day Narrow Approach: National Audubon Society v. 
Department of the Navy 
 In National Audubon Society v. Department of the Navy, the plaintiffs 
alleged that the U.S. Navy failed to conform to NEPA requirements in 
its EIS for the proposed construction of an aircraft-landing training 
field within five miles of a national wildlife refuge.114 The plaintiffs, two 
counties and multiple environmental organizations, alleged that nu-
merous agency emails and documents strongly suggested that the site 
for the landing field was predetermined as a political decision to ap-
pease surrounding communities’ concerns about jet noise.115 The trial 
court held that the Navy “reverse-engineered” the EIS to justify its pre-
determined choice of landing site.116 The Fourth Circuit, however, held 
that the lower court was overly broad in both the scope of its review and 
its injunction.117 The Fourth Circuit refused to consider the internal 
documents as evidence of a predetermined decision to locate the land-
ing strip at a specific site prior to beginning its EIS, citing Fayetteville’s 
admonition against examining an agency’s “subjective impartiality.”118 
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111 Id. at 1026. 
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Nevertheless, because of significant defects in the Navy’s EIS, the court 
ultimately concluded that the Navy failed to take a hard look at the en-
vironmental impacts of the project, and thus remanded the case in part 
and required the Navy to undertake further environmental study.119 
B. Cases Utilizing Broad Scope of Review 
1. The Ninth Circuit’s Expansive Approach: Metcalf v. Daley 
 In Metcalf v. Daley, the plaintiffs challenged a finding of no signifi-
cant impact (FONSI) prepared by the National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration’s (NOAA) National Marine Fisheries Service 
(NMFS) in regard to a proposal by the Makah Indian Tribe to resume 
whaling.120 The plaintiffs pointed to two agency agreements with the 
Makah: (1) a 1996 agreement in which NOAA, on behalf of the United 
States, promised to make a formal request to the International Whaling 
Commission (IWC), and (2) a 1997 agreement, made four days before 
the issuance of the final EA, binding the United States to pursue the 
whaling quota at the IWC on behalf of the Makah.121 The Ninth Circuit 
recognized the incentive for NOAA/NMFS to issue a FONSI; the agen-
cies would have been required to prepare an EIS upon a finding of sig-
nificant environmental impact, which may ultimately have led to a 
breach of the Makah contract.122 The court noted that even though the 
EA and FONSI in Metcalf were not facially flawed, “[i]t [was] highly like-
ly that because of the Federal Defendants’ prior written commitment . . . 
and concrete efforts . . . the EA was slanted in favor of finding that the 
. . . proposal would not significantly affect the environment.”123 Relying 
on evidence of the agreement, the court held that the agencies violated 
NEPA by making “an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of re-
sources” before taking a hard look at the potential environmental ef-
fects of the proposed action.124 
2. The Tenth Circuit’s Broad Scope: Davis v. Mineta 
 The plaintiffs in Davis v. Mineta refuted the validity of a FONSI is-
sued by the DOT and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) for 
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the proposed construction of a highway in Salt Lake City, Utah.125 The 
plaintiffs introduced an addendum to the Engineering Services Agree-
ment—between Sandy City, where the project was partially located, and 
the consultant preparing the EA—which included a contractual obliga-
tion to prepare a FONSI and have it approved, signed, and distributed 
by the FHWA.126 The Tenth Circuit held that such contractually-based 
prejudgments diminished the deference afforded to agency determina-
tions and consequently found that the FONSI was arbitrary and capri-
cious, thus violating NEPA.127 
3. Tenth Circuit Revisited: Lee v. U.S. Air Force 
 In Lee v. U.S. Air Force, the plaintiffs challenged the U.S. Air Force’s 
(USAF) FONSI for a plan to station thirty German training aircrafts at 
an aircraft base.128 The plaintiffs, ranchers and livestock associations 
located in the surrounding area, argued that an agreement between 
the United States and Germany contractually bound the USAF to ap-
prove the plan and constituted predetermination.129 The Tenth Circuit 
examined the contract and found that not only was the contract signed 
after the FONSI was issued, but the contract only stipulated that the 
United States accept a beddown of twelve German aircrafts and would 
not go into effect unless the USAF approved the action under NEPA’s 
requirements.130 Plaintiffs, however, also sought to admit a real estate 
appraiser’s affidavit that was not included in the administrative re-
cord.131 The court examined the affidavit and ultimately decided not to 
admit it because it failed to demonstrate any gaps in the agency’s analy-
sis.132 Having examined the record and the affidavit, the court found 
that the USAF had not predetermined the outcome of the impact anal-
ysis and upheld the FONSI.133 
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4. The Tenth Circuit’s Recent View: Forest Guardians v. U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service 
 The plaintiff in Forest Guardians v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, an 
environmental group, brought an action challenging the Fish and Wild-
life Service’s (FWS) FONSI for a proposed 1539(j) rule under the En-
dangered Species Act134—which sought to reintroduce a captive-bred 
experimental population of endangered falcons in New Mexico.135 The 
plaintiff relied on evidence such as intra-agency comments on the draft 
rule, agendas and minutes from meetings between the FWS and The 
Peregrine Fund (an advocate for the reintroduction of the falcon), e-
mail correspondence, and a grant agreement between the FWS and The 
Peregrine Fund to challenge the FONSI.136 The Tenth Circuit reviewed 
the evidence and concluded that it did not support a finding of prede-
termination based on the concretely defined “irreversible and irretriev-
able commitment” standard, because the comments and correspon-
dence simply showed internal disagreement and, at most, a preferred 
alternative.137 Furthermore, the court concluded that the grant agree-
ment was not a binding contract, because it simply provided expansion 
of the grant conditioned upon promulgation of another rule that called 
for the reintroduction of the Falcon population, a result that was unde-
termined because the rule was not yet approved.138 Consequently, the 
court upheld the FONSI, finding that the FWS did not predetermine 
the outcome and therefore did not act arbitrarily or capriciously.139 
C. Circuit Split: Following Narrowly Behind the Fourth Circuit or Broadly 
Behind the Tenth Circuit 
 The Fourth and Seventh Circuits employ a narrow scope of eviden-
tiary review in determining whether an agency has predetermined the 
outcome of an EIS or EA, allowing consideration of only the impact 
statement itself.140 The Ninth and Tenth Circuits reject this narrow ap-
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proach, however, and allow review of materials outside of the impact 
statement in order to enable a more rigorous and open-minded exami-
nation.141 Although both the Fourth and Tenth Circuits recognize the 
general exceptions to the record rule, the Tenth Circuit has advocated 
for the adoption of the NEPA exception—recognizing the significant 
risk behind the allegation that an EIS or EA has not been properly pre-
pared.142 The Fourth Circuit, in National Audubon, explicitly recognized 
exceptions to the record rule143 but declined to apply the Tenth Cir-
cuit’s approach employing the NEPA exception without imposing the 
burdens of the general exceptions set out in Citizens to Preserve Overton 
Park v. Volpe.144 
IV. Keeping NEPA on Track Necessitates Going off the Record 
 The lack of a uniform evidentiary standard among the circuit 
courts in reviewing whether an agency predetermined the outcome of 
its impact analysis, and therefore engaged in arbitrary or capricious de-
cision making, necessitates clearly delineated standards for courts to 
employ.145 Although the Fourth Circuit has raised doubts as to the pro-
priety of extra-record judicial inquiry by citing the risks of examining 
subjective impartiality,146 the Tenth Circuit has compellingly refuted the-
se dangers.147 Absent these hazards, the need for a rigorous examina-
tion of agency decisions148 and the interest in preventing sunk costs149 
and environmental degradation favors the admissibility of extra-record 
evidence in judicial review of agency predetermination claims. 
                                                                                                                     
A. Subjective Impartiality 
 Avoidance of the examination of subjective impartiality is an ac-
cepted tenet of the NEPA review process; however, the Fourth Circuit’s 
warnings are misplaced.150 In National Audubon Society v. Department of the 
 
141 Forest Guardians, 611 F.3d at 716–17; see Metcalf, 214 F.3d at 1143–44. 
142 See Forest Guardians, 611 F.3d at 716–17; French, supra note 87, at 952. 
143 Nat’l Audubon, 422 F.3d at 188 n.4. 
144 See Forest Guardians, 611 F.3d at 716–17; Nat’l Audubon, 422 F.3d at 198–99; Overton 
Park, 401 U.S. at 420. 
145 See Forest Guardians v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 611 F.3d 692, 716 (10th Cir. 
2010); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Dep’t of the Navy, 422 F.3d 174, 198–99 (4th Cir. 2005). 
146 See infra notes 150–158 and accompanying text. 
147 See infra notes 159–167 and accompanying text. 
148 See infra notes 168–185 and accompanying text. 
149 See infra notes 186–197 and accompanying text. 
150 See Forest Guardians, 611 F.3d at 712, 716–17. 
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Navy, the court warned that examining subjective intent under NEPA 
could open a Pandora’s Box and should be avoided.151 The court was 
wary of restricting “the open exchange of information within an agency, 
inhibit[ing] frank deliberations, and reduc[ing] the incentive to memo-
rialize ideas in written form.”152 These hypothetical restrictions on agen-
cy freedom arguably result from the agency’s fear that anything found 
in writing could be used for purposes of discerning predetermina-
tion.153 The court also argued that such an inquiry could restrict an 
agency’s capacity to change its mind or redirect its efforts.154 Further-
more, the court questioned the efficacy of such inquiries, as most agen-
cies consist of a multitude of actors with different levels of responsibili-
ties, thus making a determination of subjective intent highly specula-
tive.155 
 Although judicial psychoanalysis of subjective agency intent is un-
desirable, courts should not disregard the reality that agencies can be 
shown to have predetermined outcomes in numerous ways, many of 
which exist outside of the formal analysis itself.156 The allowance of pre-
ferred alternatives and deference to an agency’s subjective intent 
should not preclude courts from discerning whether an agency has 
predetermined the outcome of an environmental impact analysis and 
consequently violated its statutory duty.157 By categorizing much of the 
evidence of predetermination as being within the subjective license of 
agencies, the Fourth Circuit precludes the review of large amounts of 
information relevant to impact analysis challenges.158 
B. Refuting the Dangers of Expansive Review 
 The Fourth Circuit suggests that the narrow application of the re-
cord rule is necessary to avoid significant dangers associated with extra-
record review; however, the proper application of judicial review pro-
tects against these risks.159 The Tenth Circuit refuted the dangers 
warned of in National Audubon, asserting that extending its review be-
yond the NEPA analysis would not have detrimental effects because the 
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evidence considered must meet the rigorous standard of establishing 
that an agency has made “an irreversible and irretrievable commit-
ment.”160 This standard requires that such a commitment be based up-
on a particular environmental outcome, as it would therefore cause any 
subsequent environmental analysis to be “biased and flawed.”161 This 
ensures that employees need not worry about memorializing debates 
and discussions unless such communications could be characterized as 
binding the agency to a course of conduct.162 This argument assuages 
the Fourth Circuit’s concern that intra-agency freedom will be unduly 
restricted, as agency employees can feel free to write anything down 
that does not embody an impermissible commitment of resources.163 
 Similarly, the characterization of extra-record review as subjective 
is misguided because only objective evidence of conduct violative of 
NEPA’s mandates would impact the court’s decision.164 This judicial 
restraint is illustrated in Lee v. U.S. Air Force, where the court examined 
but refused to admit an extra-record affidavit that did not prove agency 
predetermination because it failed to demonstrate any gaps in the 
agency’s analysis.165 Similarly, the court in Forest Guardians v. U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service also concluded that due to the very high standard 
for predetermination, it must restrict itself to considering only relevant 
voices within the agency, namely those who could effectuate such an 
irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources.166 Due to the 
limited number of agency officials with this power and the high level of 
commitment required to bind an agency to a course of conduct, the 
Fourth Circuit’s concerns regarding the speculative nature of the in-
quiry are further quelled.167 
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C. Ensuring Rigorous Decision Making 
 Broad evidentiary review is necessary to ensure rigorous analysis of 
agency behavior, especially with regard to claims of predetermina-
tion.168 In justifying its rejection of the Fourth Circuit’s application of 
the record rule, the Tenth Circuit asserted that the narrow approach in 
National Audubon prevents a sufficiently rigorous analysis of agency de-
cision making.169 In general terms, the court claims that such a limited 
evidentiary approach “could fail to detect predetermination in cases 
where the agency has irreversibly and irretrievably committed itself to a 
course of action, but where the bias is not obvious from the face of the 
environmental analysis itself.”170 This is a concern where agencies have 
violated section 1502.2(g) of NEPA and used the Environmental Im-
pact Statement to justify decisions that have been predetermined prior 
to the completion of the impact analysis.171 Courts adopting the narrow 
approach may contend that “[w]here an agency has merely engaged in 
post hoc rationalization, there will be evidence of this in its failure to 
comprehensively investigate the environmental impact of its actions 
and acknowledge their consequences.”172 It is unlikely, however, that an 
agency would complete its analysis with noticeable deficiencies.173 
When coupled with the reality that agencies often adopt a favored 
course of action during an impact analysis, the availability of evidence 
external to the EIS takes on added importance to ensure that no irre-
versible commitment has been made prior to the Record of Deci-
sion.174 The Tenth Circuit rightly doubts the wisdom of disregarding 
evidence necessary to ensure that an agency only reaches a decision 
after carefully considering the environmental impacts of several alter-
natives.175 In order to expose premature commitments of resources 
and an agency’s violation of statutory duties under NEPA, review of evi-
dence outside the scope of the impact statement is often necessary.176 
                                                                                                                     
 This view is supported by the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Metcalf v. 
Daley, where the only evidence of predetermination was in written 
agreements made prior to the finding of no significant impact (FON-
 
168 See id. at 717. 
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SI).177 Had the Ninth Circuit in Metcalf utilized the narrow evidentiary 
approach, the court would have been unwilling to consider the agree-
ments because they were not included in the Agency’s Environmental 
Assessment (EA).178 Thus, without any evidence of irreversible and irre-
trievable commitment on the face of the analysis, the FONSI would 
have been upheld and NEPA’s purpose and protections would have 
been defeated.179 The court noted that even though the EA and FONSI 
in Metcalf were not facially flawed, it was highly likely, due to the Agen-
cy’s prior written commitment for a proposed course of action and sub-
sequent concrete efforts, that the EA was “slanted in favor” of finding 
that the proposal would have significant effects on the environment.180 
 The Tenth Circuit, in Davis v. Mineta, also provides strong support 
for the expansive evidentiary approach to predetermination review.181 
The most probative evidence pointing to predetermination by the Fed-
eral Highway Administration (FHWA) was the existence of an adden-
dum to an agreement between the parties as well as extra-record mem-
orandum and meeting minutes, but this evidentiary material would not 
have been considered under strict application of the record rule by the 
Fourth Circuit.182 The Tenth Circuit, however, having allowed the evi-
dence, was able to consider the clear evidence of prejudgment and en-
join the FHWA from proceeding with its proposal.183 By employing a 
more realistic and limited interpretation of subjectivity while maintain-
ing a high standard of relevance, the court ensured a rigorous analysis 
of the decision-making process without endangering agency autonomy 
or judicial deference.184 The protection of both NEPA’s purpose and 
agency discretion suggests that this judicial approach should guide 
courts in their review of agency impact analyses.185 
D. Prevention of Sunk Costs 
 The prevention of agency predetermination through rigorous judi-
cial review is imperative in order to deter sunk costs.186 The sunk-cost 
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strategy is used by project proponents to essentially bypass NEPA re-
quirements by committing significant resources to a project prior to ful-
filling procedural requirements such as the EA.187 Although not always 
rising to the level of sunk costs incurred in Citizens to Preserve Overton 
Park v. Volpe, where the DOT began condemning homes and making 
other significant investments prior to seeking the approval required un-
der the Endangered Species Act,188 irreversible and irretrievable com-
mitments of resources can put courts, agencies, and, most importantly, 
the environment at an impasse.189 These commitments can take the 
form of monetary expenditures, environmental harm, or even the 
breakdown of contractual negotiations or international relationships.190 
In cases like Metcalf v. Daley, where an agency has engaged in prior 
agreements that hinge on favorable results of the NEPA environmental 
analysis, the agency often has much to lose should a court find prede-
termination.191 The National Marine Fisheries Service’s (NMFS) FONSI 
was essentially a foregone conclusion based on prior agreements with 
the Makah tribe, and therefore put the agency and court in the difficult 
position of upholding NEPA and protecting the whale population or 
damaging the relationship with the Makah and potentially the IWC.192 
Although Metcalf provides an atypical example of sunk costs, in that 
monetary loss was not at issue, it is a poignant indicator of the need for 
deterrence of the sunk-cost strategy.193 
 Although CEQ regulations promulgated pursuant to NEPA in-
clude the express prohibition of irreversible and irretrievable commit-
ments of resources in an effort to combat such costs, the judicial en-
forcement mechanism is the only preventative tool for this risk.194 The 
Tenth Circuit’s broad evidentiary approach provides a stronger deter-
rent to sunk costs, as it puts agencies on notice that they cannot hide 
impermissible commitments of resources from the courts simply by ex-
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cluding them from the administrative record.195 If fully constrained by 
the record rule, courts would often be helpless to combat the biased 
decision making resulting from premature investment in a course of 
action, and would therefore be unable to enforce NEPA’s protection of 
the environment.196 Without the Tenth Circuit’s expansive approach, 
agencies such as the NMFS in Metcalf could invest in a course of action 
that leads to a predetermined outcome of the environmental assess-
ment and potentially the adoption of a less favorable alternative.197 
Conclusion 
 The environmental impact analyses undertaken by government 
agencies must be a rigorous and comprehensive report on the effects 
and alternatives of proposed actions to enable the agency and the pub-
lic to make an informed decision regarding the proposal. Although 
NEPA and the CEQ created the statutory and regulatory framework 
necessary to guide agencies in this pursuit, there is no guarantee that 
the agencies will comply with these requirements. Thus, effective guid-
ance is needed to ensure that agencies are taking the requisite hard 
look at environmental consequences of their proposals and not simply 
justifying predetermined outcomes in their impact statements. The task 
of reviewing these analyses, and therefore the successful enforcement 
of NEPA, lies with the courts. In the absence of guidance from NEPA 
and the CEQ courts have adopted different approaches, not all of 
which are adequate in rooting out predetermination.198 
 The Tenth Circuit has utilized a comprehensive and effective ap-
proach to judicial review of agency impact statements by allowing for the 
examination of relevant extra-record evidence, including materials sep-
arate from the impact report itself.199 The standards for predetermina-
tion, namely an agency’s irreversible and irretrievable commitment to 
an outcome prior to the completion of a final impact statement, provide 
intrinsic safeguards against unfavorable restriction of agency auton-
omy.200 This broad evidentiary approach enables courts to engage in a 
rigorous examination of the impact analysis without detrimentally af-
fecting the agency’s analytical process.201 Furthermore, courts can more 
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effectively combat sunk costs by being better equipped to identify im-
permissible commitments of resources.202 For these reasons, courts 
should universally adopt the broad scope of judicial review to ensure 
that NEPA’s goals and the environment itself are adequately protected. 
 
202 See supra notes 186–197 and accompanying text. 
